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lb_leeThis month's patron poll was neck-and-neck, but the winner was a transcription of the appellate court cases from Multiple Personality And Dissociation, 1791-1992: A Complete Bibliography, Second Edition by Carole Goettman, George B. Greaves, and Philip M. Coons, published by The Sidran Press in 1994. I'm working on transcribing the rest of the book, correcting the OCR errors (and the book's innate typos) along the way.
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PRECIS OF APPELLATE COURT CASES
Barnett v. State, 540 So.2d 810 (Ala. Cr. App. 1988)
Defendant appealed conviction of intentional murder of his wife, shooting her five times in the head. The plea was not guilty and not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect. The forensic examiner found that he had behavior closely resembling depersonalization with partial amnesia. The conviction was affirmed.
Barrett v. State, 772 P.2d 559 (Alaska App. 1989)
Subject walked off from a minimum security facility, being found by authorities 20 hours later. A psychiatrist testified that he suffered from depersonalization syndrome and he was found guilty but mentally ill. Judgment affirmed on appeal; sentence vacated; case remanded to lower court.
Birkner v. Salt Lake County and Flowers, 771 P.2d 1053 (Utah 1989)
Patient and clinician engaged in sexual relations. Shortly after, the patient was diagnosed with MPD. She sued County and individual (Flowers). Judgment was: Flowers50% negligent, County-40% negligent, and Birkner-10%. All appealed, and the only change was that County was now comparatively negligent for negligent supervision of Flowers, which meant that Flowers was now liable for his portion of award money. Birkner cross appealed on grounds that a mentally ill patient cannot be negligent in her own mental health treatment. Her appeal was denied.
Boyce v. State, 401 S.E.2d 578 (Ga. App. 1991)
Defendant appealed conviction of two counts of cruelty to children. Subject accused her four-year-old daughter of shooting her two-year-old son. Daughter was either severely traumatized or coached concerning her eyewitness testimony of the shooting (actually done by the mother). Psychiatrist testified that the daughter constantly referred to herself in the third person. Judgment affirmed.
Burns v. Reed, 984 F.2d 949 (7th Cir. 1990)
This is a case of iatrogenically produced MPD under hypnosis by police officers. Under advisement by Reed, the police liaison attorney, two police officers and a civilian elicited information from Burns (under hypnosis) that she had shot her two boys. She had said that "Katie" did it, and later referred to herself as "Katie." With this as their sole evidence, and without telling the judge of the hypnotic sessions, the officers obtained warrants to search and later for arrest. The case against Burns was dismissed when the details of the "confession" were brought to light, and Burns was interviewed by a specialist in MPD who determined that she was not a multiple. Burns sued Reed and the appeal was that the district court committed reversible error when it determined Reed was absolutely immune from suit. Judgment affirmed.
Burns v. Reed, 111 S.Ct. 1934 (1991)
The appeal of the previous case was questioned and the results of this appeal held that a state prosecuting attorney is absolutely immune from liability for damages for participating in a probable cause hearing, but not for giving legal advice to the police.
Commonwealth v. Comitz, 530 A.2d 473 (Pa. Super. 1987)
Defendant appealed conviction of guilty but mentally ill of murder. Her young son was dropped off bridge into water. She told police he was kidnapped from her car in a shopping center. Mental condition of atypical dissociation nearing MPD was discussed by an expert witness. Judgment affirmed.
Commonwealth v. McDonald, 487 N.E.2d 224 (Mass. App. 1986)
Defendant appealed conviction of armed assault with intent to murder, carrying a firearm without lawful authority, and assault by means of a dangerous weapon. Defendant sent to determine mental condition, and the psychiatrist placed him under hypnosis to determine if fugue state or MPD was indicated. At the trial, defendant testified that he had amnesia concerning the incident or arrest. Judgment affirmed.
Commonwealth v. Robert E. Marshall, Mass., 364 N.E.2d 1237 (1977)
Defendant killed two people with two witnesses, which resulted in a conviction of two counts of first degree murder. Subject turned himself in, but had no memory of the incident. On appeal, he pled insanity but would not subject to neurological testing as part of psychological testing, so judgment was affirmed.
Darby v. State, 514 N.E.2d 1049 (Ind. 1987)
Defendant appealed conviction of guilty but mentally ill of voluntary manslaughter with 20-year sentence. Darby lost memory of incident before seeing a lawyer and so said she was not competent to stand trial. Two psychologists testified that psychogenic amnesia was indicated, but two others found her sane. Judgment affirmed.
Davis v. Oilfield Scrap & Equipment Co., 482 So.2d 970 (La. App. 3rd Cir. 1986)
Mary Davis was a high functioning multiple personality, and secretary to the president of the defendant. On February 25, 1982, Rothschild (president) committed suicide by shooting himself in the chest. Davis heard the shot and for the next 20 minutes contacted emergency services, administered first aid, while trying to cope with the stress of the situation. Rothschild was dead by the time authorities got there, and Davis was alternatively sedate then hysterical. Soon after she began to have depression, emotional instability, dissociative episodes, and suicidal thoughts, which caused her doctor to convince her to admit herself into the University of Kentucky Medical Center under the care of Dr. Cornelia Wilbur. This case, appealed by the Workers' Compensation company, held that it should not be liable for employee benefits, payment of penalties and attorney's fees, and expert witness fee of $1000. Judgment was upheld for employee benefits and expert witness fees, but reversed in part for penalties and attorney's fees.
Davis v. Oilfield Scrap & Equipment Co., 503 So.2d 674 (La. App. 3rd Cir. 1987)
The first case involved workers' compensation, but this case is a tort suit against general liability. Since the Workers' Compensation company paid for any bodily injury, and since the suicide of her boss was not intentional on the part of the defendant, judgment was affirmed.
DeKaplany v. Emanoto, 540 F.2d 975 (1976)
DeKaplany appealed his conviction of murder by torture. After hearing about the unfaithfulness of his wife of five weeks, subject bound and gagged her, cut her with a knife, and poured nitric acid over her. Part of the appeal was that the defendant sought a competency hearing, but the doctors for the prosecution said he was legally sane; defense doctors said he was legally insane. The defense doctors termed the diagnosis differently: "paranoid-schizophrenic," and "multiple personality with acute schizophrenic reaction," but they agreed he had serious mental problems when he committed the acts. Judgment affirmed, with another judge filing a concurring opinion, and two others filing dissenting opinions.
Gallion v. United States, 386 F.2d 255 (1967)
Defendant appealed conviction of interstate transportation of forged securities. Gallion was hitchhiking when he was picked up by Russell Frey. After traveling together for about a week, Gallion stole two wallets of Frey's and left. Using Frey's cards, he rented cars, registered in hotels and cashed checks. At one hotel, management became suspicious, and Gallion asked to speak to an FBI agent. At first, he told the agent that he had used Frey's identification in renting cars and recalled in particular cashing a check at a specific hotel. At the trial, Gallion testified that he did not remember writing the check or being in the hotel. His defense was that he was in a fugue state and believed himself to be Richard Frey. A doctor testified that the defendant had a dissociative reaction in which one may either lose identity or have a substitute identity. The prosecution pointed out that Frey's picture was on his ID, and the doctor admitted that in seeing it, the defendant probably would have known he was not Frey. Judgment affirmed.
Hall v. Freese, 735 F.2d 956 (1984)
Plaintiff was in a van which was struck by a truck owned by Altruk Freight and driven by Freese. She suffered severe physical injuries, leading to epilepsy and psychosis. Hall's psychiatrist testified that she was suffering from multiple personality disorder, and others said "post traumatic depression," acutely psychotic, completely disabled, etc. The first case brought a judgment of $55,000. Plaintiff appealed and judgment was reversed and remanded.
Heinecke v. Department of Commerce, 810 P.2d 459 (Utah App. 1991)
Heinecke, a nurse, petitioned the revocation of his license for immoral, unethical and unprofessional conduct. He was working with a multiple personality patient in a psychiatric hospital, and became sexually involved with one or more of her alters. She had just gotten married two weeks before entering the hospital and was told for physical and psychological reasons to practice birth control. She had been ritually abused and there was concern by some members of the staff about protecting the patient from cult members. When the relationship between nurse and patient became obvious to the hospital, they told the nurse to stay away from the patient. He asked for a leave of absence, and she asked for a release from the hospital. Patient and her husband moved in with the nurse so he could "protect" her when her husband was at work. The hospital found out about the situation. Patient said that he took care of her like he did at the hospital, but she became pregnant with his child. Judgment affirmed.
In interest of R.H.L., 464 N.W.2d 848 (Wis. App. 1990)
R.H.L., a juvenile, was charged by delinquency petition on four counts of sexual assaults of which two were dismissed. One of three examining doctors concluded that R.H.L. suffered from "dissociative disorders" or "multiple personality." R.H.L. appealed judge's decision to place him in the care of the Department of Health and Social Services, and requested a trial by jury with a plea of not responsible by reason of mental disease or defect. Original order by the judge affirmed.
In re Arnett, 565 A.2d 963 (D.C. App. 1989)
Arnett is an attorney licensed in Hawaii and the District of Columbia, and was suspended in Hawaii for six months for misconduct including gross neglect. In the District of Columbia she was suspended for six months including requirements that fitness for reinstatement in District of Columbia Bar be proved by clear evidence. It was found that Ms. Arnett suffered from dissociative disorders which hampered her work with clients. Hawaii took this and her performance rated by her peers, and that she agreed to be monitored, as mitigating factors and suspension was lifted after six months. The District of Columbia added the requirement that fitness for reinstatement be proved. Suspension ordered.
Johnson v. Johnson, 701 F.Supp. 1363 (N.D. Ill. 1988)
Parents of plaintiff moved to dismiss adult daughter's suit, alleging sexual abuse while she was a child. Plaintiff remembered the abuse by her father during the course of therapy nearly 20 years later. Her therapist, Ms. Raymer, diagnosed her with multiple personality disorder. The question of the court centered around the "discovery rule," when facts come to light after the statute of limitations. In this case, judgment was for the plaintiff, and motion denied.
Johnson v. Johnson, 766 F.Supp. 662 (1991)
This is another motion for summary judgment by the multiple personality patient's parents to bar action against them. This time the question of the credentials of the daughter's therapist was at issue, and since she was determined not to be an expert, her testimony was excluded. Without sound expert witness testimony, the judge ruled in favor of the parents. Motion granted.
Kirby v. State, 410 S.E.2d 333 (Ga. App. 1991)
Defendant appealed conviction of guilty but mentally ill of 12 felony and 18 misdemeanor offenses. Kirby suffered from multiple personality disorder and believed that court should have found him not guilty by reason of insanity. Judgment affirmed.
Kirkland v. State, 304 S.E.2d 561 (Ga. App. 1983)
This is a landmark case concerning the responsibility of a person with multiple personality disorder. The defendant, charged with two counts of bank robbery pled not guilty by reason of insanity. The court found her guilty but mentally ill, and she appealed. Kirkland robbed two banks in disguise, and when captured, confessed to the crimes by saying a "bad" alter had done them. The judge spoke copiously on the culpability of a person with multiple personality disorder. The crucial legal test was M'Naghten. Even if an alter committed crimes unknown to an alleged host personality, if the alter knew legal right from wrong at the time of the actions, the insanity plea cannot be sustained. Judgment affirmed.
Kort v. Ross Michael Carlson, Col., 723 P.2d 143 (1986)
The defendant was charged with first-degree murder of his parents. He was committed as incompetent to stand trial and was sent to a state psychiatric hospital for therapeutic treatment. Guidelines were recommended by the court for therapy, but a year and a half later the defendant refused to participate because he did not trust them. He wanted an outside therapist, so a Dr. Quinn was brought in for consultation. His opinion was that Carlson was there to get better in order to be competent to stand trial, but since Carlson did not trust the hospital it would be expedient to find someone he did trust. In August 1985 the defendant filed a motion to have the state pay for outside doctor's fees. In December 1985 the court granted this. The appeal by Kort, the Superintendent of Colorado State Hospital, was to show cause why payments must be made. Judge ruled for defendant.
Lee v. Thompson, 452 F.Supp. 165 (1977)
Having exhausted other court action, Lee filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus on grounds that his convictions of murder and felonious assault were unconstitutional. Lee, when discovering that his wife (whom he was divorcing) and her ex-husband were out boating on a lake, immediately purchased a gun, went to the lake, persuaded friends to take him out on the lake where his wife and ex-husband were, and upon arriving proceeded to shoot at them, killing Mrs. Lee and wounding her ex-husband. Lee made no further trouble and later confessed to shooting them, although he said he was insane at the time. Both prosecution and defense psychiatrists examined Lee, and both agreed that he was suffering from a dissociative reaction. Other witnesses testified that the day before Lee had seemed sane. The Court said that due process did not require the jury to accept the conclusions of the psychiatrists, so the petition for habeas corpus relief was denied.
Parker v. State, 597 S.W.2d 586 (Ark. 1980)
Ms. Parker appealed conviction of theft by deception, and sentenced to ten years to run concurrently. Her defense was that she had dual personality. She pursued a check "kiting" scheme against two banks, and said that it was her other personality who did it. The appeal was mostly because the court refused to admit results of a sodium amytal interview. The court affirmed.
Parker v. State, 606 S.W.2d 746 (Ark. 1980)
This same case went back to appeals court, and the important question was that the court did not allow any reference to the term "sodium amytal interview" in the courtroom proceedings, along with several other points for reversal. The importance of sodium amytal in dealing with certain dissociative cases became clear to the judge, and he reversed and remanded.
Parker v. Williams, 855 F.2d 763 (11th Cir. 1988)
Plaintiff was in county jail and was kidnapped and raped by the chief jailer. As a result, Parker suffered post-traumatic stress disorder, difficulty in finding work because of her fear of crowded places, and sleep-disturbances. In the original trial the jury found the chief jailer (Williams), the sheriff and the county liable and awarded $100,000 compensatory and $100,000 punitive damages. The sheriff and county appealed since they are immune from tort claims. In this case, it was found that the sheriff was negligent in hiring and training practices. When he hired Williams he did not follow up to find that Williams had been hospitalized and diagnosed schizophrenic. The court found the sheriff liable as an individual, so the county was not liable for punitive damages. Affirmed in part, reversed in part.
Parker v. Williams, 862 F.2d 1471 (11th Cir. 1989)
Appeal to previous case in which defendant sought a higher court's decision in which the sheriff and the county were responsible for tort damages. This court vacated judgments against the sheriff and the county; the case was reversed and remanded for a new trial, holding that the previous decision erred in applying collateral estoppel to preclude Amerson (sheriff) and the county from litigating the issue of rape.
Parson v. State, 275 A.2d 777 (Del. Supr. 1977)
Appellant was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to death in 1966. The appeal then was affirmed, but a writ of habeas corpus questioned his competency to stand trial. He had genuine psychogenic amnesia for a period of several hours before the crime until several hours after. Another trial was ordered after competency hearings concluded he was competent to stand trial. The second trial also found him guilty of first degree murder and sentenced to death. This appeal brought into question nine items for the court to deliberate. The one that concerns us here is the issue that again considers Parsons incompetent to stand trial because of his amnesia of the crime. The psychiatrists all testified that his amnesia was not feigned, but the court believed there to be enough circumstantial and direct evidence to reconstruct the crime scene without the direct testimony of Parsons. Judgment affirmed.
People v. Baldi, App. Div. 76 A.D.2d 259 (NY 1980)
An apparently mentally ill defendant was diagnosed as schizophrenic mental retardee, regression, hysterical personality of the dissociative type, and multiple personality. He had been in and out of mental hospitals most of his adult life, and was seriously disturbed. This was made evident to the defense counsel when questioning Baldi with police present. The defendant went into a trance state, whereby he proceeded to reenact several murders. Defense counsel used this information to put himself on the stand and tell exactly what happened. This was his way of making the court see that Baldi was evidently insane, but it backfired on him, and Baldi was convicted in two separate trials of attempted murder, burglary in the second degree, possession of weapons, and murder. Baldi got another attorney, and appealed that he was insane, and there was incompetency of counsel. Through long discourse and difficult proceedings, the appeal was granted and reversed.
People v. Baldi, 429 N.E.2d 400 (NY 1981)
The People appealed the reversal of the previous case. That case overturned the convictions of Baldi because it was deemed that Baldi was denied effective counsel. This court said that the defense attorney taking the stand was consistent with and strengthened the insanity defense. Judgment reversed and remitted.
People v. Bruetsch, 137 A.D.2d 823 (A.O. 2 Dept 1988)
Witnesses testified at this trial that the defendant shot his estranged wife several times, killing her. He was convicted of murder in the second degree. The defendant testified that he had no memory of the shooting. Two psychiatrists testified that he had a dissociative disorder, but with the weight of evidence against him, the jury convicted him to a sentence of 20 years to life. In the appeal, the judge found the conviction correct, but the sentence excessive and lowered it to from [sic] 15 years to life.
People v. Coogler, 454 P.2d 686 (Cal. 1969)
Defendant appealed conviction of first-degree murder, assault with intent to commit murder, robbery while armed with deadly weapon, kidnapping to commit robbery with body harm, and the sentence was the death penalty. Coogler pled not guilty and relied on a theory of diminished capacity at the guilt phase. It did not work and he was convicted at trial. A psychiatrist testified that the defendant had endured a "disassociation reaction" which he had experienced several times in the past. When emerging from one of these spells he could recollect little of what occurred. Other doctors did tests and came up with other diagnoses. The appeal court affirmed the trial court's decision.
People v. Gacy, 468 N.E.2d 1171 (Ill. 1984)
This is a highly publicized case in which the defendant was convicted on 33 counts of murder and other sexual deviant behavior. In this appeal many factors were explored by the court, but the one pertinent here concerns his insanity pica. Several psychiatrists testified with various diagnoses, and Dr. Richard Rappaport consulted with Dr. Cornelia Wilbur about the possibility of the "Jack Hanley" alias being an alter. Dr. Wilbur confirmed his conclusion that this was not multiple personality disorder. Judgment affirmed.
People v. McBroom, 70 Cal. Rptr. 326 (1968)
Defendant appealed conviction of burglary and assault with a deadly weapon. He and two other men were in the process of burglarizing a grocery store, when police arrived on the scene. In the midst of a shoot-out, the subject was shot in the back of the head and in the right leg. He claimed that he remembered nothing, and wanted the right to a continuance until he regained his memory. The court said that amnesia was not a defense for a crime, and affirmed judgment.
People v. Schwartz, 482 N.E.2d 104 (Ill. App. 2 Dist. 1985)
This dramatic case had the defendant appealing a conviction of not guilty by reason of insanity of murder, and guilty but mentally ill of aggravated arson and arson. The defendant was in the middle of a custody hearing for his four daughters, had lost his wife to another man, had lost his job because he could not concentrate on it, and in general was in a very distraught and anxiously depressed state. On the day of the incident, Schwartz deliberately set fire to his house and opened gas mains to the stove, causing it to blow up the house. Later he went to his wife's boyfriend's place of business, told everyone to stay put, went into the back, shot the boyfriend and calmly walked out. Sometime after that he was found in the woods across the street and he had shot himself in the chest. After awakening in the hospital a few days later, defendant said he could not remember anything of the fire and shooting. In question were his amnesia and insanity defenses, especially since he was found not guilty by reason of insanity for murder, and guilty but mentally ill for the arson charges. The court found no incongruities in testimony given, and judgments for murder and arson were affirmed. The aggravated arson charge was reversed because of recent holding which rendered aggravated arson statute unconstitutional.
People v. Teague, 439 N.E.2d 1066 (Ill. App. 1982)
Defendant appealed conviction of guilty of three counts of attempted murder and two counts of armed robbery. Subject pled not guilty by reason of insanity. Two psychiatrists testified for the defense: one said he was suffering from a psychoneurotic anxiety reaction, and the other said he was suffering from a hysterical fugue state which caused him to act in an automatic, robot-like manner. Both had the opinion that the defendant could not appreciate the criminality of his acts. A psychiatrist for the State said that he had passive aggressive personality with alcoholism and was responsible for his acts. The judgment was affirmed.
People v. Wade, 729 P.2d 239 (Cal. 1987)
The defendant was convicted of murder by torture in the first degree and sentenced to death. He abused his wife and children continuously, and one day, he beat one of his girls to death, using his fists, a wooden board, throwing her against the wall and on the floor, kicking her, and putting a dog leash around her neck. Wade was determined to have multiple personality disorder by three doctors, and "possession syndrome," an atypical dissociative reaction by Dr. Ralph Allison. The three prosecution psychiatrists testified as follows: 1) "emotionally immature and disturbed person"; 2) "a pathological liar and multiple personality was malingered"; and 3) "legally sane." Much testimony concerning the insanity plea centered around one of his alters "Othello" who was thought by Wade to be a demon possessing his body. The appeal found judgment of guilt and torture-murder special circumstances affirmed, but special circumstances clause reversed the penalty of death.
People v. Wade, 750 P.2d 794 (Cal. 1988)
The rehearing of the previous appealed case to impose sentence found that special circumstance instruction was sufficient. Judgment of guilt and imposition of death penalty affirmed.
Ramer v. United States, 390 F.2d 564 (1968)
Appellant was convicted of bank robbery and appealed. Ramer's sole defense was insanity, and said he could not remember the details of the robberies. A defense psychiatrist testified that there was a possibility of Ramer being in a fugue state, but later said that he probably was not. This case contained much discussion of the M'Naghten rule and when legal insanity applies. Judgment affirmed.
Rodrigues v. Hawaii, 105 S.Ct. 580 (1984)[See State v. Rodrigues]
Rodrigues was indicted on three counts of sodomy and one count of rape. Before empaneling of a jury, the court suspended proceedings, appointed a panel of psychiatrists to examine the defendant, and proceeded to try the issue of insanity. Five experts testified that the defendant had multiple personality disorder, and the judge concluded that the defendant was insane and entered an acquittal. The State appealed and the Supreme Court of Hawaii reversed and remanded on the ground that the trial court erred in weighing the evidence as to insanity. The U.S. Supreme Court dismissed this appeal for want of jurisdiction.
Rutherford v. Rutherford, 401 S.E.2d 177 (S.C. App. 1990)
Husband brought action against wife for divorce on grounds of adultery and for denial of alimony. Court denied husband the divorce and granted the wife $400 a month alimony, and the husband appealed. The wife had multiple personality disorder and stated that another alter may have been seeing another man. Appeals Court held that she was responsible to control various personalities, and reversed judgment and remanded with instructions to enter judgment for husband on grounds of adultery. The wife petitioned for rehearing but was denied.
Sample v. Schweiker, 694 F.2d 639 (1982)
Claimant filed for disability benefits and was denied. Upon exhaustion of administrative appeal he initiated suit in district court. His alleged afflictions included back and joint pain, cysts, alcoholism, bleeding ulcers, drug dependence and use, and mental disorder. A psychiatrist testified that Sample suffered from a dissociative reaction characterized by a split personality, and believed he needed in-depth psychotherapy and was disabled. The court heard from several other doctors and affirmed judgment.
State v. Adcock, 310 S.E.2d 587 (N.C. 1983)
Defendant appealed conviction of first degree murder of his estranged wife. He had followed her in his car and shot her twice. A defense forensic psychiatrist, Dr. Robert Miller; testified that he had been seeing defendant for some time and that in his opinion, the subject was suffering from manic-depression as well as multiple personality disorder. The defendant had no memory of the time surrounding the shooting, so Dr. Miller used hypnosis to bring the details to mind. Based on 15 sessions with him, Dr. Miller got the following: Defendant depressed because of estrangement, followed wife in his car honking the horn to get her attention. When she did not respond, he determined that it was not his wife--that it was a creature somewhat like a sack of potatoes. He felt in order to save his wife he needed to rid the world of this evil creature. Two psychiatrists for the prosecution testified, the first simply stating in his opinion that the defendant did not have multiple personality. The second said he had a mixed personality disorder (which has explosive antisocial hysterical and narcissistic features). The Court found no error in the original judgment.
State v. Alley, 776 S.W.2d 506 (Tenn. 1989)
Defendant was convicted of premeditated first degree murder, kidnapping and aggravated rape, and received a sentence of death. He appealed. The facts were that he was lonely, depressed and unhappy. One night while his wife was out, he drank a six-pack and a fifth of wine and went out to get more. Between then and 6:00 a.m. when the victim's body had been found, the defendant had forcibly taken the victim, a woman Marine who was jogging at the time, beaten her, unclothed her and stuck a 31" stick up her vagina. She died of multiple injuries. His sanity was in question so several psychiatrists were called on for opinions. Defendant had amnesia for the events of the evening. Two psychiatrists diagnosed the defendant with multiple personality disorder. One had videotaped hypnotic and sodium amytal interviews of the defendant, but this evidence was excluded since a jury of laymen could not understand and interpret reliably. Five prosecution psychiatrists evaluated the defendant and their findings showed him to be a "malingerer with borderline personality disorder and mixed substance abuse." The convictions and
sentences imposed in the trial court were affirmed.
State v. Armentor, 470 So.2d 401 (La. App. 3 Cir. 1985)
Defendant appealed conviction of armed robbery and aggravated rape with sentences of life and 50 years to run concurrently without parole. He pled not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity. A sanity trial was commissioned, and although they found Armentor competent to stand trial, no determination of defendant's sanity at the time of the offense had been made. One doctor tentatively diagnosed him as paranoid schizophrenic. The other had a tentative diagnosis of multiple personality. Neither was asked for further testing by defense. Because of this and the fact that there was plenty of time for testing to be done before the trial, the appeal affirmed the lower court.
State v. Bishop, 260 A.2d 393 (Vt. 1969)
This case involves a man shooting his wife in the stomach (non-fatally) with witnesses present. He entered a plea of not guilty or not guilty by reason of insanity. He was convicted of disturbing and breaking the public peace by assaulting his wife with a gun, and he appealed. The issue of his sanity or insanity at the time of the shooting was at stake. The defendant said he remembered nothing. The prosecution had an abundance of witnesses that testified Bishop appeared rational. The defense had witnesses that testified that he seemed easily upset, depressed, not himself, etc., but the psychiatric expert witness testified that the defendant was suffering from a mental defect or disease at the time of the shooting known as "dissociated reaction," and he believed that the defendant was temporarily insane at the time. The doctor based a large part of his findings on the amnesia the defendant said he had, but it was noted that shortly after the shooting occurred, Bishop made a Statement to the police giving all details of events. The judgment was affirmed.
State v. Bonney, 405 S.E.2d 145 (N.C. 1991)
Bonney appealed the conviction of first degree murder of his daughter on the theory of premeditation and deliberation with a sentence of death. Defendant had taken daughter out one evening, but she did not return with him. The next day her nude body was found in a gully with 27 bullets in her, mostly in her head. In the next few days, defendant made many statements, both incriminating and denying his role in the shooting. Dr. Paul Dell, a clinical psychologist, testified that the defendant had multiple personality disorder and at the time of the shootings was incapable of knowing the nature and quality of his actions. He also had video interviews with the defendant under hypnosis which were admitted as evidence. A prosecution expert witness on multiple personality disorder, Dr. Philip Coons, reviewed 13 hours of the tapes, and was highly critical of the methods of interviewing and use of hypnosis Dr. Dell had used. The judge affirmed the guilt conviction, but the death sentence was vacated and remanded for new capital sentencing.
State v. Brooks, 495 N.E.2d 407 (Ohio 1986)
Defendant appealed conviction of three counts of aggravated murder and sentenced to three death penalties. Brooks, under a great deal of stress and mental illness, shot his three sons in the head as they slept, then packed some things and got on a bus. Before reaching his destination, police apprehended him and arrested him. A psychiatric hearing was held to determine his competency, and he was found competent despite the fact that he said he had amnesia. The Court said that the "record shows a man who had a cold, calculated plan to murder his own sons and carried it out successfully. While he did suffer from some mental illness, he did not lack the capacity to appreciate the criminality of his actions..." Judgment and sentence were affirmed.
State v. Darnell, 614 P.2d 120 (Oregon App. 1980)
A strange case in which son (defendant) had a contract put out on his father at his father's request, in order to use the insurance money to pay for the father's debts. The son Darnell pled not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect. Three expert witnesses testified at his trial that he had a severe form of "alternating multiple personality." The facts of his multiplicity came out quite blatantly in the trial, but the jury still found him responsible and guilty of the murder of his father. Appeal affirmed.
State v. Dillard, 718 P.2d 1272 (Idaho App. 1986)
Dillard was a minor at the time he murdered a woman and set fire to the house, but the court determined to try him as an adult. He pled not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect. He was examined by Dr. Jones, a psychologist, who submitted a preliminary diagnosis of "a very rare and complex form of multiple personality disorder." He asked that an expert be retained to evaluate more completely, so Dr. Donald Lunde was contacted. No mention was made of Dr. Lunde's findings. Defendant was convicted of murder and arson, and this appeal failed.
State v. Donnelly, 798 P.2d 89 (Mont. 1990)
Defendant was convicted of incest. He had sexual relations and contact with his minor adopted daughter "Janey Doe," from 1980 through 1987. As a result, the daughter suffered from multiple personality disorder. His sentence was that he was ineligible for parole until the successful completion of the sexual offender program, and aftercare treatment. The defendant denied any incest relationship, and appealed. The judgment was affirmed.
State v. Edwards, 677 P.2d 1325 (Ariz. App. 1983)
This defendant was convicted of theft by extortion, and aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. His defenses were not guilty by reason of insanity and mistaken identity. The record shows that the victim, a homosexual, was entertaining a male friend one evening, and the friend arranged to have some marijuana delivered. The defendant and his accomplice showed up, produced a gun and demanded money. The victim had no money, so Edwards made he and his friend disrobe, and took pictures of them in compromising positions. The pictures were later used in an attempt to extort money. After his arrest some ten days later, it became known that the defendant had a long history of mental illness, first being diagnosed in 1968 as paranoid schizophrenic and later that he "tended to disassociate himself from reality... referred to as a psychologic fugue state." Unfortunately, the counsel for the defense prepared the case in only six hours, did not interview anyone (except the psychiatrist on the day of the trial), and generally did a poor job of defending. Edwards got new counsel and appealed. The court recognized that he had ineffectual counsel at the trial, so reversed and remanded for a new trial.
State v. Freeman, 404 N.W.2d 188 (Iowa App. 1987)
Defendant appealed conviction of first-degree theft with indeterminant prison term not to exceed ten years. Defendant stole a car that he agreed to purchase and was apprehended a few days later in another state. His defense was insanity and/or diminished capacity. Two doctors filed depositions that they concluded with "reasonable certainty" that the defendant suffered from multiple personality disorder, although they said no other personalities made themselves known and evidence of malingering was present. The State offered expert testimony that there was no multiple personality present. The guilt was affirmed but the sentence was vacated and remanded.
State v. Grimsley, 444 N.E.2d 1071 (Ohio App. 1982)
Defendant appealed conviction of driving under the influence of alcohol. The defendant pled not guilty by reason of insanity, given that she had multiple personality disorder. She contended that she could not be held liable for acts of another personality, who in this case had a serious problem with alcohol. The Court disagreed, and stated that she failed to establish her defense of insanity. However, the Court did fail in allowing a jury trial so the judgment was reversed and the case remanded for a jury trial.
State v. Jones, 743 P.2d 276 (Washington App. 1987)
Defendant was convicted of premeditated first-degree murder and he appealed. He had picked up a woman at a bar and took her to his apartment. He strangled her with panty hose, stabbed her 12 times, then attempted to rape her. He had thought to leave town but did not have enough money, so he turned himself in. His plea was insanity, and the defense psychiatrist gave a theory that the defendant had multiple personality disorder. The prosecution psychologist Dr. Kathleen Mayers observed Jones from the jail and hospital, and said he was suffering from obsessive compulsive personality disorder but he was competent to stand trial. At the trial he was sentenced to 280 months. This appeal affirmed.
State v. Jones, 759 P.2d 1183 (Wash. 1988)
This second appeal of the last case also affirmed judgment and sentence. By pleading insanity a defendant waives his privilege of self-incrimination in psychiatric hearings.
State v. L.K., 582 A.2d 297 (N.J. Super. A.D. 1990)
Defendant was charged with murder of her father and aunt, conspiracy to murder them and her nine-year-old brother, attempted murder of father and aunt and attempted murder of brother. No other details of actual crime were given, but the case dealt mostly with accessibility, use, and evaluation of video and audiotapes and notes from psychiatric interviews involving the insanity plea of a multiple personality disorder defendant. Especially noted were those using hypnosis. Prior appeal issued orders denying discovery for the State and the prosecution appealed. This appeal affirms that if the State wanted to make a case, it should conduct its own desired psychiatric examinations. Any sessions in which hypnosis is used should be videotaped, and defendant's psychiatrists should have some way of knowing what is going on in the room (as in using one-way mirrors or dosed circuit television). As modified, orders under review are affirmed.
State v. McClain, 591 A.2d 652 (N.J. Super. A.D. 1991)
Defendant appealed conviction of purposeful and knowing murder and unlawful possession of weapon. Defendant had "battered woman syndrome" and at some point in her relationship with the victim, she shot him three times in a bar. Testimony of the defense psychologist portrayed McClain as going through years of psychological humiliation and putting up with victim's infidelities. In the doctor's opinion the defendant was in a "dissociated" state when she shot the victim. The State psychiatrist rejected any notion of dissociated state. The judgment was affirmed.
State v, Moore, 550 A.2d 117 (NJ 1988)
During a time period encompassing twenty-seven months, a then-35-year-old female--Marie Moore of New Jersey--held thrall over various female teenagers, an older woman (age 50), and two early male teens including one Ricky Flores, age 14. The enthrallment was couched in an elaborate illusion by Ms. Moore, by which she convinced them that she was the ex-wife of the famous composer and songwriter from New York, Billy Joel, the father of her daughter, Tammy. Once the illusion was established, Ms. Moore used the authority of "Billy Joel" to "discipline" and "punish" those around her. As her behavior raged increasingly out of control, she recruited Ricky Flores, through sexual and other favors, into the sadistic torture of her enslaved compound of adolescent girls. Although the injuries of several of the girls was taken note of by school officials, and though Marie Moore was repeatedly investigated by police and child protection agencies, insufficient evidence could be developed to arrest her. Matters began to come to a head when in the autumn of 1982, Theresa Feury, one of the victims involved, was actually killed, albeit possibly accidently [sic], by Ricky Flores, following extreme conditions of bondage, physical cruelty, and deprivation of basic physical needs. The body was hidden in Marie Moore's apartment and was not discovered until a year later by police. Moore was tried on first degree murder and was sentenced to death by the jury; Flores, a juvenile, exempt from the death penalty, plea bargained. Moore appealed to the New Jersey Supreme Court, based on errors in the trial judge's various charges to the jury. Three highly-credentialed expert witnesses for the defense stated that Marie Moore suffered from multiple personality. The trial judge should therefore have instructed the jury to address the issue of her possible diminished capacity to conform to the ordinary standards of social behavior and the law, if the testimony of the defense experts had been believed by the jury, and to consider alternative levels of conviction, such as manslaughter. Secondly, since Moore did not commit the homicide by her own hand, the death penalty should not apply. The Supreme Court agreed with both arguments. Conviction and sentencing were both reversed and the case was remanded to the original court of jurisdiction.
State v. Moran, 584 So.2d 318 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1991)
Defendant was convicted for aggravated rape and attempted kidnapping and appealed. He accosted victim in a park, forcibly raped her in his car and beat her. He threw her onto the street when she struggled with him. The victim remembers getting up and thinking she had to get to a doctor. She did not remember anything until she awoke in the hospital eleven days later. A psychiatrist found she was suffering from "psychogenic amnesia with regression." She was not able to make a statement to the police concerning the attack until 16 days after the occurrence, and the court found this to be admissible due to her regressed state. The judgments were affirmed but the case was remanded to the trial court to determine if a new trial was denied or not prior to sentencing.
State v. Perkins, 811 P.2d 1142 (1991)
Defendant appealed conviction of first degree murder, aggravated robbery and rape. He pled insanity, telling a police officer that he had split personality, one being Dennis (doing good) and the other Drifter (doing bad). One doctor who testified said that Perkins was schizophrenic, rather than having multiple personalities. Judgment affirmed.
State v. Rodrigues, 679 P.2d 615 (Haw. 1984)[See Rodrigues v. Hawaii)
The State appealed from a judgment of acquittal granted by the trial judge on pre-trial motion to determine the sanity of the defendant. For over two years after the defendant was arrested, he was treated by several doctors, both prosecution and defense. Most of the doctors believed this to be a case of "multiple personality syndrome" and in August 1982 the judge granted an acquittal. The State appealed because it felt there was sufficient evidence to present the sanity issue to a jury. This Court vacated and remanded on those grounds. It also stated that a "defense of multiple personality syndrome (MPS) does not per se require a finding of acquittal."
State v. Sanchez, 659 P.2d 1289 (Ariz. App. 1982)
Defendant appealed conviction of child molestation and sexual conduct with a minor under 15. He pled insanity based on his expert witness, who testified that Sanchez suffered from a dissociative disorder "psychogenic fugue." The Court psychologist disagreed in her testimony. Judgment affirmed.
State v. Shank, 367 S.E.2d 639 (N.C. 1988)
Defendant appealed conviction of first-degree murder. Shank had many arguments with his estranged wife about custody of their children. In the last argument, Mrs. Shank said that "no matter what he did, she would make sure that he would never get to see the children again." The defendant did not remember anything from then until he was arrested. Two psychiatrists for the defense and one for the prosecution believed the defendant to be suffering from "psychogenic amnesia," and believed the trauma he went through severe enough to prevent him from understanding what he was doing. The trial court did not allow this testimony and the appeal court believes this was error and required a new trial.
State v. Shickles, 760 P.2d 291 (Utah 1988)
Defendant appealed conviction of child kidnapping. He met and became friends with the victim's family, and one day was asked to bring the children to the babysitter. He left two of the three girls with the babysitter, and brought one with him. He took her to Denver by plane, telling her they were going shopping there. In Denver he got a motel room and showered naked with her and engaged in sexual activity three times. She was not physically harmed. The next day he went to the bus station and called the child's parents. He was arrested at the bus station. The charge was kidnapping (sexual abuse charges were omitted because of lack of jurisdiction). The defendant pled not guilty by reason of insanity. Two doctors testified that he had multiple personality disorder or dissociative disorders, but the jury found him guilty and mentally ill. At the sentencing hearing, the Court imposed a ten year to life sentence. The Appeals Court reversed and remanded.
State v. Summers, 614 P.2d 925 (Hawaii 1980)
Defendant appealed conviction of carrying firearm without permit or license. He pled insanity and a three member sanity commission unanimously found that he was now able to stand trial, but that he was substantially mentally impaired at the time of offense. He was diagnosed with schizophrenia reaction, paranoid type, and hysterical neurosis (or multiple personality disorder). A pre-trial motion for acquittal was denied, and the jury found him guilty. The appeal affirmed the decision.
State v. Swails, 66 So.2d 796 (La. 1953)
The defendant was indicted for murder and attempted murder, and he pled insanity. At the insanity hearing, two doctors examined him and testified he was presently insane. The Court had him committed to the state institution. Eight months later the hospital informed the judge that the defendant's condition had improved to the point of being able to understand the charges against him and to aid in his own defense. At the next hearing the Court again sent him back because of insanity. This appeal to the Supreme Court of Louisiana reversed and remanded the case to trial.
State v. Watkins, 340 So.2d 235 (La. 1976)
Defendant appealed conviction of aggravated rape and mandatory death sentence. A nurse was requested by Watkins from a home nursing service, and when she got to the defendant's home, she was forcibly assaulted and raped. She was then tied up and left in a wooded area near a field. The victim freed herself and later identified the defendant as her assailant. He pled not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity, saying that he could not remember anything surrounding the incident. The defense offered testimony from a doctor who said that Watkins could not distinguish right from wrong at the time of the offense, and suffered from "hysterical neurosis of the dissociated type." The prosecution produced a taped statement which damaged the amnesia theory. The Appeals Court affirmed the conviction, but remanded case to district court for resentencing.
State v. Woodard, 404 S.E.2d 6 (N.C. App. 1991)
Defendant appealed conviction of four counts of first-degree burglary, four counts of first-degree rape, and eight counts of first-degree sexual offense with a sentence of two consecutive life sentences. This case deals with a probable multiple personality, and the results of not giving the court information concerning this. The defense made a decision not to elicit testimony from the alter personality "Johnny Gustud," fearing it might appear to the jury as a "Hollywood ploy." This approach backfired when "Johnny Gustud" came out during the charge conference, and was not allowed to testify. He became disruptive and had to be removed from the court-room for the rest of the trial. The judgment was affirmed.
Thompson v. State, 542 So.2d 1286 (Ala. Cr. App. 1988)
Defendant appealed conviction of capital murder, and the sentence of death. This shocking and brutal murder of the victim who was engaged to a friend of the defendant, appeared to be the work of a madman. The burden of proof of insanity fell to the defense. The defendant's father testified that he believed his son suffered from multiple personality disorder, but there were no expert witnesses who had interviewed him to testify to that opinion. The lunacy commission found him to be sane. This court affirmed trial court's convictions.
United States ex. rel. Heirens v. Pate, 405 F.2d 449 (1968)
Petition for habeas corpus was denied, and appealed. In September 1946 the petitioner (Heirens) pleaded guilty to three charges of murder and twenty-six charges of burglary, robbery and assault and received three consecutive life sentences on the murder convictions plus other consecutive sentences for other charges. The court had previously ordered a panel of three psychiatrists to examine Heirens, and their report stated that he was sane. Since there was no evidence to doubt the petitioner's sanity, the trial court did not conduct a competency hearing. The petitioner objected to the fact that the opinion of a fourth doctor, who interviewed Heirens with sodium pentothal, was not included. That doctor advised the State Attorney that petitioner was a "schizophrenic with a dual personality," but the State chose not to include that information in the report. The Appeals Court affirmed prior proceedings.
United States ex. rel. Parson v. Anderson, 354 F. Supp. 1060 (1972)
State prisoner petitioned for habeas corpus (Sec Parson v. State). This petition dealt thoroughly with the amnesia and insanity questions. This Court's decision was basically to recommend mercy in regard to the death penalty.
United States v. Davis, 835 F.2d 274 (11th Cir. 1988)
Defendant appealed conviction of bank robbery. He pleaded not guilty by reason of insanity, and on this appeal defendant argued that court allowed and elicited improper psychiatric testimony. In the trial defendant had three prisoners from jail testify that they had seen personality changes in Davis. Defense also called an expert witness, Dr. George B. Greaves, who described multiple personalities but was unable to determine if Davis had the condition as he had not personally interviewed the defendant. Greaves also said that having multiple personality disorder did not indicate that a person is unable to know what he was doing. The government called a psychiatrist who diagnosed Davis as having an antisocial personality disorder. Judgment affirmed.
United States v. Hopkins, 169 F. Supp. 187 (D. Md. 1958)
Defendant was charged with seven counts of stealing from authorized mail receptacles, and his defense was insanity. This case went into Hopkins' past and discussed his history of mental problems and lost time, amnesia, and possible "other personality." Many doctors had different opinions of his diagnosis, but none were sufficiently convincing to show him insane. The court was convinced that he took checks from the mailboxes for personal gain, and not from insanity, despite his mental problems.
United States v. Warren, 447 F.2d 278 (1971)
The defendant appealed a conviction of unlawful interstate transportation of four valuable stolen paintings. Defendant pled temporary insanity, due to the drug prednisone he was taking at the time for asthma. The defense doctors testified that Warren must have been taking more than the prescribed dose and caused "fugues, confabulation and dissociated state." The defendant, a successful businessman, stole valuable paintings from an acquaintance and proceeded to try to sell them to an art gallery. The defense tried to show that while stealing, transporting, and attempting to sell the paintings, Warren was possibly in an irresponsible disassociated state. The Appeals Court affirmed trial court's judgment.
Wheeler v. Sullivan, 888 F.2d 1233 (8th Cir. 1989)
Ms. Wheeler had applied for social security disability benefits due to severe mental impairment, and was denied by Sullivan, Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services. She took the case to court which upheld the Secretary's decision, and Wheeler appealed. Much psychological testing was done and many diagnoses given including multiple personality, but because her impairment did not meet criteria for the Listing of Impairments for disability, she was not given benefits. However, this Court stated that the Secretary must use vocational expert testimony to meet his burden of showing Wheeler capable of doing past work--in this case housekeeping. The case was reversed and remanded for further proceedings.
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PRECIS OF APPELLATE COURT CASES
Barnett v. State, 540 So.2d 810 (Ala. Cr. App. 1988)
Defendant appealed conviction of intentional murder of his wife, shooting her five times in the head. The plea was not guilty and not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect. The forensic examiner found that he had behavior closely resembling depersonalization with partial amnesia. The conviction was affirmed.
Barrett v. State, 772 P.2d 559 (Alaska App. 1989)
Subject walked off from a minimum security facility, being found by authorities 20 hours later. A psychiatrist testified that he suffered from depersonalization syndrome and he was found guilty but mentally ill. Judgment affirmed on appeal; sentence vacated; case remanded to lower court.
Birkner v. Salt Lake County and Flowers, 771 P.2d 1053 (Utah 1989)
Patient and clinician engaged in sexual relations. Shortly after, the patient was diagnosed with MPD. She sued County and individual (Flowers). Judgment was: Flowers50% negligent, County-40% negligent, and Birkner-10%. All appealed, and the only change was that County was now comparatively negligent for negligent supervision of Flowers, which meant that Flowers was now liable for his portion of award money. Birkner cross appealed on grounds that a mentally ill patient cannot be negligent in her own mental health treatment. Her appeal was denied.
Boyce v. State, 401 S.E.2d 578 (Ga. App. 1991)
Defendant appealed conviction of two counts of cruelty to children. Subject accused her four-year-old daughter of shooting her two-year-old son. Daughter was either severely traumatized or coached concerning her eyewitness testimony of the shooting (actually done by the mother). Psychiatrist testified that the daughter constantly referred to herself in the third person. Judgment affirmed.
Burns v. Reed, 984 F.2d 949 (7th Cir. 1990)
This is a case of iatrogenically produced MPD under hypnosis by police officers. Under advisement by Reed, the police liaison attorney, two police officers and a civilian elicited information from Burns (under hypnosis) that she had shot her two boys. She had said that "Katie" did it, and later referred to herself as "Katie." With this as their sole evidence, and without telling the judge of the hypnotic sessions, the officers obtained warrants to search and later for arrest. The case against Burns was dismissed when the details of the "confession" were brought to light, and Burns was interviewed by a specialist in MPD who determined that she was not a multiple. Burns sued Reed and the appeal was that the district court committed reversible error when it determined Reed was absolutely immune from suit. Judgment affirmed.
Burns v. Reed, 111 S.Ct. 1934 (1991)
The appeal of the previous case was questioned and the results of this appeal held that a state prosecuting attorney is absolutely immune from liability for damages for participating in a probable cause hearing, but not for giving legal advice to the police.
Commonwealth v. Comitz, 530 A.2d 473 (Pa. Super. 1987)
Defendant appealed conviction of guilty but mentally ill of murder. Her young son was dropped off bridge into water. She told police he was kidnapped from her car in a shopping center. Mental condition of atypical dissociation nearing MPD was discussed by an expert witness. Judgment affirmed.
Commonwealth v. McDonald, 487 N.E.2d 224 (Mass. App. 1986)
Defendant appealed conviction of armed assault with intent to murder, carrying a firearm without lawful authority, and assault by means of a dangerous weapon. Defendant sent to determine mental condition, and the psychiatrist placed him under hypnosis to determine if fugue state or MPD was indicated. At the trial, defendant testified that he had amnesia concerning the incident or arrest. Judgment affirmed.
Commonwealth v. Robert E. Marshall, Mass., 364 N.E.2d 1237 (1977)
Defendant killed two people with two witnesses, which resulted in a conviction of two counts of first degree murder. Subject turned himself in, but had no memory of the incident. On appeal, he pled insanity but would not subject to neurological testing as part of psychological testing, so judgment was affirmed.
Darby v. State, 514 N.E.2d 1049 (Ind. 1987)
Defendant appealed conviction of guilty but mentally ill of voluntary manslaughter with 20-year sentence. Darby lost memory of incident before seeing a lawyer and so said she was not competent to stand trial. Two psychologists testified that psychogenic amnesia was indicated, but two others found her sane. Judgment affirmed.
Davis v. Oilfield Scrap & Equipment Co., 482 So.2d 970 (La. App. 3rd Cir. 1986)
Mary Davis was a high functioning multiple personality, and secretary to the president of the defendant. On February 25, 1982, Rothschild (president) committed suicide by shooting himself in the chest. Davis heard the shot and for the next 20 minutes contacted emergency services, administered first aid, while trying to cope with the stress of the situation. Rothschild was dead by the time authorities got there, and Davis was alternatively sedate then hysterical. Soon after she began to have depression, emotional instability, dissociative episodes, and suicidal thoughts, which caused her doctor to convince her to admit herself into the University of Kentucky Medical Center under the care of Dr. Cornelia Wilbur. This case, appealed by the Workers' Compensation company, held that it should not be liable for employee benefits, payment of penalties and attorney's fees, and expert witness fee of $1000. Judgment was upheld for employee benefits and expert witness fees, but reversed in part for penalties and attorney's fees.
Davis v. Oilfield Scrap & Equipment Co., 503 So.2d 674 (La. App. 3rd Cir. 1987)
The first case involved workers' compensation, but this case is a tort suit against general liability. Since the Workers' Compensation company paid for any bodily injury, and since the suicide of her boss was not intentional on the part of the defendant, judgment was affirmed.
DeKaplany v. Emanoto, 540 F.2d 975 (1976)
DeKaplany appealed his conviction of murder by torture. After hearing about the unfaithfulness of his wife of five weeks, subject bound and gagged her, cut her with a knife, and poured nitric acid over her. Part of the appeal was that the defendant sought a competency hearing, but the doctors for the prosecution said he was legally sane; defense doctors said he was legally insane. The defense doctors termed the diagnosis differently: "paranoid-schizophrenic," and "multiple personality with acute schizophrenic reaction," but they agreed he had serious mental problems when he committed the acts. Judgment affirmed, with another judge filing a concurring opinion, and two others filing dissenting opinions.
Gallion v. United States, 386 F.2d 255 (1967)
Defendant appealed conviction of interstate transportation of forged securities. Gallion was hitchhiking when he was picked up by Russell Frey. After traveling together for about a week, Gallion stole two wallets of Frey's and left. Using Frey's cards, he rented cars, registered in hotels and cashed checks. At one hotel, management became suspicious, and Gallion asked to speak to an FBI agent. At first, he told the agent that he had used Frey's identification in renting cars and recalled in particular cashing a check at a specific hotel. At the trial, Gallion testified that he did not remember writing the check or being in the hotel. His defense was that he was in a fugue state and believed himself to be Richard Frey. A doctor testified that the defendant had a dissociative reaction in which one may either lose identity or have a substitute identity. The prosecution pointed out that Frey's picture was on his ID, and the doctor admitted that in seeing it, the defendant probably would have known he was not Frey. Judgment affirmed.
Hall v. Freese, 735 F.2d 956 (1984)
Plaintiff was in a van which was struck by a truck owned by Altruk Freight and driven by Freese. She suffered severe physical injuries, leading to epilepsy and psychosis. Hall's psychiatrist testified that she was suffering from multiple personality disorder, and others said "post traumatic depression," acutely psychotic, completely disabled, etc. The first case brought a judgment of $55,000. Plaintiff appealed and judgment was reversed and remanded.
Heinecke v. Department of Commerce, 810 P.2d 459 (Utah App. 1991)
Heinecke, a nurse, petitioned the revocation of his license for immoral, unethical and unprofessional conduct. He was working with a multiple personality patient in a psychiatric hospital, and became sexually involved with one or more of her alters. She had just gotten married two weeks before entering the hospital and was told for physical and psychological reasons to practice birth control. She had been ritually abused and there was concern by some members of the staff about protecting the patient from cult members. When the relationship between nurse and patient became obvious to the hospital, they told the nurse to stay away from the patient. He asked for a leave of absence, and she asked for a release from the hospital. Patient and her husband moved in with the nurse so he could "protect" her when her husband was at work. The hospital found out about the situation. Patient said that he took care of her like he did at the hospital, but she became pregnant with his child. Judgment affirmed.
In interest of R.H.L., 464 N.W.2d 848 (Wis. App. 1990)
R.H.L., a juvenile, was charged by delinquency petition on four counts of sexual assaults of which two were dismissed. One of three examining doctors concluded that R.H.L. suffered from "dissociative disorders" or "multiple personality." R.H.L. appealed judge's decision to place him in the care of the Department of Health and Social Services, and requested a trial by jury with a plea of not responsible by reason of mental disease or defect. Original order by the judge affirmed.
In re Arnett, 565 A.2d 963 (D.C. App. 1989)
Arnett is an attorney licensed in Hawaii and the District of Columbia, and was suspended in Hawaii for six months for misconduct including gross neglect. In the District of Columbia she was suspended for six months including requirements that fitness for reinstatement in District of Columbia Bar be proved by clear evidence. It was found that Ms. Arnett suffered from dissociative disorders which hampered her work with clients. Hawaii took this and her performance rated by her peers, and that she agreed to be monitored, as mitigating factors and suspension was lifted after six months. The District of Columbia added the requirement that fitness for reinstatement be proved. Suspension ordered.
Johnson v. Johnson, 701 F.Supp. 1363 (N.D. Ill. 1988)
Parents of plaintiff moved to dismiss adult daughter's suit, alleging sexual abuse while she was a child. Plaintiff remembered the abuse by her father during the course of therapy nearly 20 years later. Her therapist, Ms. Raymer, diagnosed her with multiple personality disorder. The question of the court centered around the "discovery rule," when facts come to light after the statute of limitations. In this case, judgment was for the plaintiff, and motion denied.
Johnson v. Johnson, 766 F.Supp. 662 (1991)
This is another motion for summary judgment by the multiple personality patient's parents to bar action against them. This time the question of the credentials of the daughter's therapist was at issue, and since she was determined not to be an expert, her testimony was excluded. Without sound expert witness testimony, the judge ruled in favor of the parents. Motion granted.
Kirby v. State, 410 S.E.2d 333 (Ga. App. 1991)
Defendant appealed conviction of guilty but mentally ill of 12 felony and 18 misdemeanor offenses. Kirby suffered from multiple personality disorder and believed that court should have found him not guilty by reason of insanity. Judgment affirmed.
Kirkland v. State, 304 S.E.2d 561 (Ga. App. 1983)
This is a landmark case concerning the responsibility of a person with multiple personality disorder. The defendant, charged with two counts of bank robbery pled not guilty by reason of insanity. The court found her guilty but mentally ill, and she appealed. Kirkland robbed two banks in disguise, and when captured, confessed to the crimes by saying a "bad" alter had done them. The judge spoke copiously on the culpability of a person with multiple personality disorder. The crucial legal test was M'Naghten. Even if an alter committed crimes unknown to an alleged host personality, if the alter knew legal right from wrong at the time of the actions, the insanity plea cannot be sustained. Judgment affirmed.
Kort v. Ross Michael Carlson, Col., 723 P.2d 143 (1986)
The defendant was charged with first-degree murder of his parents. He was committed as incompetent to stand trial and was sent to a state psychiatric hospital for therapeutic treatment. Guidelines were recommended by the court for therapy, but a year and a half later the defendant refused to participate because he did not trust them. He wanted an outside therapist, so a Dr. Quinn was brought in for consultation. His opinion was that Carlson was there to get better in order to be competent to stand trial, but since Carlson did not trust the hospital it would be expedient to find someone he did trust. In August 1985 the defendant filed a motion to have the state pay for outside doctor's fees. In December 1985 the court granted this. The appeal by Kort, the Superintendent of Colorado State Hospital, was to show cause why payments must be made. Judge ruled for defendant.
Lee v. Thompson, 452 F.Supp. 165 (1977)
Having exhausted other court action, Lee filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus on grounds that his convictions of murder and felonious assault were unconstitutional. Lee, when discovering that his wife (whom he was divorcing) and her ex-husband were out boating on a lake, immediately purchased a gun, went to the lake, persuaded friends to take him out on the lake where his wife and ex-husband were, and upon arriving proceeded to shoot at them, killing Mrs. Lee and wounding her ex-husband. Lee made no further trouble and later confessed to shooting them, although he said he was insane at the time. Both prosecution and defense psychiatrists examined Lee, and both agreed that he was suffering from a dissociative reaction. Other witnesses testified that the day before Lee had seemed sane. The Court said that due process did not require the jury to accept the conclusions of the psychiatrists, so the petition for habeas corpus relief was denied.
Parker v. State, 597 S.W.2d 586 (Ark. 1980)
Ms. Parker appealed conviction of theft by deception, and sentenced to ten years to run concurrently. Her defense was that she had dual personality. She pursued a check "kiting" scheme against two banks, and said that it was her other personality who did it. The appeal was mostly because the court refused to admit results of a sodium amytal interview. The court affirmed.
Parker v. State, 606 S.W.2d 746 (Ark. 1980)
This same case went back to appeals court, and the important question was that the court did not allow any reference to the term "sodium amytal interview" in the courtroom proceedings, along with several other points for reversal. The importance of sodium amytal in dealing with certain dissociative cases became clear to the judge, and he reversed and remanded.
Parker v. Williams, 855 F.2d 763 (11th Cir. 1988)
Plaintiff was in county jail and was kidnapped and raped by the chief jailer. As a result, Parker suffered post-traumatic stress disorder, difficulty in finding work because of her fear of crowded places, and sleep-disturbances. In the original trial the jury found the chief jailer (Williams), the sheriff and the county liable and awarded $100,000 compensatory and $100,000 punitive damages. The sheriff and county appealed since they are immune from tort claims. In this case, it was found that the sheriff was negligent in hiring and training practices. When he hired Williams he did not follow up to find that Williams had been hospitalized and diagnosed schizophrenic. The court found the sheriff liable as an individual, so the county was not liable for punitive damages. Affirmed in part, reversed in part.
Parker v. Williams, 862 F.2d 1471 (11th Cir. 1989)
Appeal to previous case in which defendant sought a higher court's decision in which the sheriff and the county were responsible for tort damages. This court vacated judgments against the sheriff and the county; the case was reversed and remanded for a new trial, holding that the previous decision erred in applying collateral estoppel to preclude Amerson (sheriff) and the county from litigating the issue of rape.
Parson v. State, 275 A.2d 777 (Del. Supr. 1977)
Appellant was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to death in 1966. The appeal then was affirmed, but a writ of habeas corpus questioned his competency to stand trial. He had genuine psychogenic amnesia for a period of several hours before the crime until several hours after. Another trial was ordered after competency hearings concluded he was competent to stand trial. The second trial also found him guilty of first degree murder and sentenced to death. This appeal brought into question nine items for the court to deliberate. The one that concerns us here is the issue that again considers Parsons incompetent to stand trial because of his amnesia of the crime. The psychiatrists all testified that his amnesia was not feigned, but the court believed there to be enough circumstantial and direct evidence to reconstruct the crime scene without the direct testimony of Parsons. Judgment affirmed.
People v. Baldi, App. Div. 76 A.D.2d 259 (NY 1980)
An apparently mentally ill defendant was diagnosed as schizophrenic mental retardee, regression, hysterical personality of the dissociative type, and multiple personality. He had been in and out of mental hospitals most of his adult life, and was seriously disturbed. This was made evident to the defense counsel when questioning Baldi with police present. The defendant went into a trance state, whereby he proceeded to reenact several murders. Defense counsel used this information to put himself on the stand and tell exactly what happened. This was his way of making the court see that Baldi was evidently insane, but it backfired on him, and Baldi was convicted in two separate trials of attempted murder, burglary in the second degree, possession of weapons, and murder. Baldi got another attorney, and appealed that he was insane, and there was incompetency of counsel. Through long discourse and difficult proceedings, the appeal was granted and reversed.
People v. Baldi, 429 N.E.2d 400 (NY 1981)
The People appealed the reversal of the previous case. That case overturned the convictions of Baldi because it was deemed that Baldi was denied effective counsel. This court said that the defense attorney taking the stand was consistent with and strengthened the insanity defense. Judgment reversed and remitted.
People v. Bruetsch, 137 A.D.2d 823 (A.O. 2 Dept 1988)
Witnesses testified at this trial that the defendant shot his estranged wife several times, killing her. He was convicted of murder in the second degree. The defendant testified that he had no memory of the shooting. Two psychiatrists testified that he had a dissociative disorder, but with the weight of evidence against him, the jury convicted him to a sentence of 20 years to life. In the appeal, the judge found the conviction correct, but the sentence excessive and lowered it to from [sic] 15 years to life.
People v. Coogler, 454 P.2d 686 (Cal. 1969)
Defendant appealed conviction of first-degree murder, assault with intent to commit murder, robbery while armed with deadly weapon, kidnapping to commit robbery with body harm, and the sentence was the death penalty. Coogler pled not guilty and relied on a theory of diminished capacity at the guilt phase. It did not work and he was convicted at trial. A psychiatrist testified that the defendant had endured a "disassociation reaction" which he had experienced several times in the past. When emerging from one of these spells he could recollect little of what occurred. Other doctors did tests and came up with other diagnoses. The appeal court affirmed the trial court's decision.
People v. Gacy, 468 N.E.2d 1171 (Ill. 1984)
This is a highly publicized case in which the defendant was convicted on 33 counts of murder and other sexual deviant behavior. In this appeal many factors were explored by the court, but the one pertinent here concerns his insanity pica. Several psychiatrists testified with various diagnoses, and Dr. Richard Rappaport consulted with Dr. Cornelia Wilbur about the possibility of the "Jack Hanley" alias being an alter. Dr. Wilbur confirmed his conclusion that this was not multiple personality disorder. Judgment affirmed.
People v. McBroom, 70 Cal. Rptr. 326 (1968)
Defendant appealed conviction of burglary and assault with a deadly weapon. He and two other men were in the process of burglarizing a grocery store, when police arrived on the scene. In the midst of a shoot-out, the subject was shot in the back of the head and in the right leg. He claimed that he remembered nothing, and wanted the right to a continuance until he regained his memory. The court said that amnesia was not a defense for a crime, and affirmed judgment.
People v. Schwartz, 482 N.E.2d 104 (Ill. App. 2 Dist. 1985)
This dramatic case had the defendant appealing a conviction of not guilty by reason of insanity of murder, and guilty but mentally ill of aggravated arson and arson. The defendant was in the middle of a custody hearing for his four daughters, had lost his wife to another man, had lost his job because he could not concentrate on it, and in general was in a very distraught and anxiously depressed state. On the day of the incident, Schwartz deliberately set fire to his house and opened gas mains to the stove, causing it to blow up the house. Later he went to his wife's boyfriend's place of business, told everyone to stay put, went into the back, shot the boyfriend and calmly walked out. Sometime after that he was found in the woods across the street and he had shot himself in the chest. After awakening in the hospital a few days later, defendant said he could not remember anything of the fire and shooting. In question were his amnesia and insanity defenses, especially since he was found not guilty by reason of insanity for murder, and guilty but mentally ill for the arson charges. The court found no incongruities in testimony given, and judgments for murder and arson were affirmed. The aggravated arson charge was reversed because of recent holding which rendered aggravated arson statute unconstitutional.
People v. Teague, 439 N.E.2d 1066 (Ill. App. 1982)
Defendant appealed conviction of guilty of three counts of attempted murder and two counts of armed robbery. Subject pled not guilty by reason of insanity. Two psychiatrists testified for the defense: one said he was suffering from a psychoneurotic anxiety reaction, and the other said he was suffering from a hysterical fugue state which caused him to act in an automatic, robot-like manner. Both had the opinion that the defendant could not appreciate the criminality of his acts. A psychiatrist for the State said that he had passive aggressive personality with alcoholism and was responsible for his acts. The judgment was affirmed.
People v. Wade, 729 P.2d 239 (Cal. 1987)
The defendant was convicted of murder by torture in the first degree and sentenced to death. He abused his wife and children continuously, and one day, he beat one of his girls to death, using his fists, a wooden board, throwing her against the wall and on the floor, kicking her, and putting a dog leash around her neck. Wade was determined to have multiple personality disorder by three doctors, and "possession syndrome," an atypical dissociative reaction by Dr. Ralph Allison. The three prosecution psychiatrists testified as follows: 1) "emotionally immature and disturbed person"; 2) "a pathological liar and multiple personality was malingered"; and 3) "legally sane." Much testimony concerning the insanity plea centered around one of his alters "Othello" who was thought by Wade to be a demon possessing his body. The appeal found judgment of guilt and torture-murder special circumstances affirmed, but special circumstances clause reversed the penalty of death.
People v. Wade, 750 P.2d 794 (Cal. 1988)
The rehearing of the previous appealed case to impose sentence found that special circumstance instruction was sufficient. Judgment of guilt and imposition of death penalty affirmed.
Ramer v. United States, 390 F.2d 564 (1968)
Appellant was convicted of bank robbery and appealed. Ramer's sole defense was insanity, and said he could not remember the details of the robberies. A defense psychiatrist testified that there was a possibility of Ramer being in a fugue state, but later said that he probably was not. This case contained much discussion of the M'Naghten rule and when legal insanity applies. Judgment affirmed.
Rodrigues v. Hawaii, 105 S.Ct. 580 (1984)[See State v. Rodrigues]
Rodrigues was indicted on three counts of sodomy and one count of rape. Before empaneling of a jury, the court suspended proceedings, appointed a panel of psychiatrists to examine the defendant, and proceeded to try the issue of insanity. Five experts testified that the defendant had multiple personality disorder, and the judge concluded that the defendant was insane and entered an acquittal. The State appealed and the Supreme Court of Hawaii reversed and remanded on the ground that the trial court erred in weighing the evidence as to insanity. The U.S. Supreme Court dismissed this appeal for want of jurisdiction.
Rutherford v. Rutherford, 401 S.E.2d 177 (S.C. App. 1990)
Husband brought action against wife for divorce on grounds of adultery and for denial of alimony. Court denied husband the divorce and granted the wife $400 a month alimony, and the husband appealed. The wife had multiple personality disorder and stated that another alter may have been seeing another man. Appeals Court held that she was responsible to control various personalities, and reversed judgment and remanded with instructions to enter judgment for husband on grounds of adultery. The wife petitioned for rehearing but was denied.
Sample v. Schweiker, 694 F.2d 639 (1982)
Claimant filed for disability benefits and was denied. Upon exhaustion of administrative appeal he initiated suit in district court. His alleged afflictions included back and joint pain, cysts, alcoholism, bleeding ulcers, drug dependence and use, and mental disorder. A psychiatrist testified that Sample suffered from a dissociative reaction characterized by a split personality, and believed he needed in-depth psychotherapy and was disabled. The court heard from several other doctors and affirmed judgment.
State v. Adcock, 310 S.E.2d 587 (N.C. 1983)
Defendant appealed conviction of first degree murder of his estranged wife. He had followed her in his car and shot her twice. A defense forensic psychiatrist, Dr. Robert Miller; testified that he had been seeing defendant for some time and that in his opinion, the subject was suffering from manic-depression as well as multiple personality disorder. The defendant had no memory of the time surrounding the shooting, so Dr. Miller used hypnosis to bring the details to mind. Based on 15 sessions with him, Dr. Miller got the following: Defendant depressed because of estrangement, followed wife in his car honking the horn to get her attention. When she did not respond, he determined that it was not his wife--that it was a creature somewhat like a sack of potatoes. He felt in order to save his wife he needed to rid the world of this evil creature. Two psychiatrists for the prosecution testified, the first simply stating in his opinion that the defendant did not have multiple personality. The second said he had a mixed personality disorder (which has explosive antisocial hysterical and narcissistic features). The Court found no error in the original judgment.
State v. Alley, 776 S.W.2d 506 (Tenn. 1989)
Defendant was convicted of premeditated first degree murder, kidnapping and aggravated rape, and received a sentence of death. He appealed. The facts were that he was lonely, depressed and unhappy. One night while his wife was out, he drank a six-pack and a fifth of wine and went out to get more. Between then and 6:00 a.m. when the victim's body had been found, the defendant had forcibly taken the victim, a woman Marine who was jogging at the time, beaten her, unclothed her and stuck a 31" stick up her vagina. She died of multiple injuries. His sanity was in question so several psychiatrists were called on for opinions. Defendant had amnesia for the events of the evening. Two psychiatrists diagnosed the defendant with multiple personality disorder. One had videotaped hypnotic and sodium amytal interviews of the defendant, but this evidence was excluded since a jury of laymen could not understand and interpret reliably. Five prosecution psychiatrists evaluated the defendant and their findings showed him to be a "malingerer with borderline personality disorder and mixed substance abuse." The convictions and
sentences imposed in the trial court were affirmed.
State v. Armentor, 470 So.2d 401 (La. App. 3 Cir. 1985)
Defendant appealed conviction of armed robbery and aggravated rape with sentences of life and 50 years to run concurrently without parole. He pled not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity. A sanity trial was commissioned, and although they found Armentor competent to stand trial, no determination of defendant's sanity at the time of the offense had been made. One doctor tentatively diagnosed him as paranoid schizophrenic. The other had a tentative diagnosis of multiple personality. Neither was asked for further testing by defense. Because of this and the fact that there was plenty of time for testing to be done before the trial, the appeal affirmed the lower court.
State v. Bishop, 260 A.2d 393 (Vt. 1969)
This case involves a man shooting his wife in the stomach (non-fatally) with witnesses present. He entered a plea of not guilty or not guilty by reason of insanity. He was convicted of disturbing and breaking the public peace by assaulting his wife with a gun, and he appealed. The issue of his sanity or insanity at the time of the shooting was at stake. The defendant said he remembered nothing. The prosecution had an abundance of witnesses that testified Bishop appeared rational. The defense had witnesses that testified that he seemed easily upset, depressed, not himself, etc., but the psychiatric expert witness testified that the defendant was suffering from a mental defect or disease at the time of the shooting known as "dissociated reaction," and he believed that the defendant was temporarily insane at the time. The doctor based a large part of his findings on the amnesia the defendant said he had, but it was noted that shortly after the shooting occurred, Bishop made a Statement to the police giving all details of events. The judgment was affirmed.
State v. Bonney, 405 S.E.2d 145 (N.C. 1991)
Bonney appealed the conviction of first degree murder of his daughter on the theory of premeditation and deliberation with a sentence of death. Defendant had taken daughter out one evening, but she did not return with him. The next day her nude body was found in a gully with 27 bullets in her, mostly in her head. In the next few days, defendant made many statements, both incriminating and denying his role in the shooting. Dr. Paul Dell, a clinical psychologist, testified that the defendant had multiple personality disorder and at the time of the shootings was incapable of knowing the nature and quality of his actions. He also had video interviews with the defendant under hypnosis which were admitted as evidence. A prosecution expert witness on multiple personality disorder, Dr. Philip Coons, reviewed 13 hours of the tapes, and was highly critical of the methods of interviewing and use of hypnosis Dr. Dell had used. The judge affirmed the guilt conviction, but the death sentence was vacated and remanded for new capital sentencing.
State v. Brooks, 495 N.E.2d 407 (Ohio 1986)
Defendant appealed conviction of three counts of aggravated murder and sentenced to three death penalties. Brooks, under a great deal of stress and mental illness, shot his three sons in the head as they slept, then packed some things and got on a bus. Before reaching his destination, police apprehended him and arrested him. A psychiatric hearing was held to determine his competency, and he was found competent despite the fact that he said he had amnesia. The Court said that the "record shows a man who had a cold, calculated plan to murder his own sons and carried it out successfully. While he did suffer from some mental illness, he did not lack the capacity to appreciate the criminality of his actions..." Judgment and sentence were affirmed.
State v. Darnell, 614 P.2d 120 (Oregon App. 1980)
A strange case in which son (defendant) had a contract put out on his father at his father's request, in order to use the insurance money to pay for the father's debts. The son Darnell pled not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect. Three expert witnesses testified at his trial that he had a severe form of "alternating multiple personality." The facts of his multiplicity came out quite blatantly in the trial, but the jury still found him responsible and guilty of the murder of his father. Appeal affirmed.
State v. Dillard, 718 P.2d 1272 (Idaho App. 1986)
Dillard was a minor at the time he murdered a woman and set fire to the house, but the court determined to try him as an adult. He pled not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect. He was examined by Dr. Jones, a psychologist, who submitted a preliminary diagnosis of "a very rare and complex form of multiple personality disorder." He asked that an expert be retained to evaluate more completely, so Dr. Donald Lunde was contacted. No mention was made of Dr. Lunde's findings. Defendant was convicted of murder and arson, and this appeal failed.
State v. Donnelly, 798 P.2d 89 (Mont. 1990)
Defendant was convicted of incest. He had sexual relations and contact with his minor adopted daughter "Janey Doe," from 1980 through 1987. As a result, the daughter suffered from multiple personality disorder. His sentence was that he was ineligible for parole until the successful completion of the sexual offender program, and aftercare treatment. The defendant denied any incest relationship, and appealed. The judgment was affirmed.
State v. Edwards, 677 P.2d 1325 (Ariz. App. 1983)
This defendant was convicted of theft by extortion, and aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. His defenses were not guilty by reason of insanity and mistaken identity. The record shows that the victim, a homosexual, was entertaining a male friend one evening, and the friend arranged to have some marijuana delivered. The defendant and his accomplice showed up, produced a gun and demanded money. The victim had no money, so Edwards made he and his friend disrobe, and took pictures of them in compromising positions. The pictures were later used in an attempt to extort money. After his arrest some ten days later, it became known that the defendant had a long history of mental illness, first being diagnosed in 1968 as paranoid schizophrenic and later that he "tended to disassociate himself from reality... referred to as a psychologic fugue state." Unfortunately, the counsel for the defense prepared the case in only six hours, did not interview anyone (except the psychiatrist on the day of the trial), and generally did a poor job of defending. Edwards got new counsel and appealed. The court recognized that he had ineffectual counsel at the trial, so reversed and remanded for a new trial.
State v. Freeman, 404 N.W.2d 188 (Iowa App. 1987)
Defendant appealed conviction of first-degree theft with indeterminant prison term not to exceed ten years. Defendant stole a car that he agreed to purchase and was apprehended a few days later in another state. His defense was insanity and/or diminished capacity. Two doctors filed depositions that they concluded with "reasonable certainty" that the defendant suffered from multiple personality disorder, although they said no other personalities made themselves known and evidence of malingering was present. The State offered expert testimony that there was no multiple personality present. The guilt was affirmed but the sentence was vacated and remanded.
State v. Grimsley, 444 N.E.2d 1071 (Ohio App. 1982)
Defendant appealed conviction of driving under the influence of alcohol. The defendant pled not guilty by reason of insanity, given that she had multiple personality disorder. She contended that she could not be held liable for acts of another personality, who in this case had a serious problem with alcohol. The Court disagreed, and stated that she failed to establish her defense of insanity. However, the Court did fail in allowing a jury trial so the judgment was reversed and the case remanded for a jury trial.
State v. Jones, 743 P.2d 276 (Washington App. 1987)
Defendant was convicted of premeditated first-degree murder and he appealed. He had picked up a woman at a bar and took her to his apartment. He strangled her with panty hose, stabbed her 12 times, then attempted to rape her. He had thought to leave town but did not have enough money, so he turned himself in. His plea was insanity, and the defense psychiatrist gave a theory that the defendant had multiple personality disorder. The prosecution psychologist Dr. Kathleen Mayers observed Jones from the jail and hospital, and said he was suffering from obsessive compulsive personality disorder but he was competent to stand trial. At the trial he was sentenced to 280 months. This appeal affirmed.
State v. Jones, 759 P.2d 1183 (Wash. 1988)
This second appeal of the last case also affirmed judgment and sentence. By pleading insanity a defendant waives his privilege of self-incrimination in psychiatric hearings.
State v. L.K., 582 A.2d 297 (N.J. Super. A.D. 1990)
Defendant was charged with murder of her father and aunt, conspiracy to murder them and her nine-year-old brother, attempted murder of father and aunt and attempted murder of brother. No other details of actual crime were given, but the case dealt mostly with accessibility, use, and evaluation of video and audiotapes and notes from psychiatric interviews involving the insanity plea of a multiple personality disorder defendant. Especially noted were those using hypnosis. Prior appeal issued orders denying discovery for the State and the prosecution appealed. This appeal affirms that if the State wanted to make a case, it should conduct its own desired psychiatric examinations. Any sessions in which hypnosis is used should be videotaped, and defendant's psychiatrists should have some way of knowing what is going on in the room (as in using one-way mirrors or dosed circuit television). As modified, orders under review are affirmed.
State v. McClain, 591 A.2d 652 (N.J. Super. A.D. 1991)
Defendant appealed conviction of purposeful and knowing murder and unlawful possession of weapon. Defendant had "battered woman syndrome" and at some point in her relationship with the victim, she shot him three times in a bar. Testimony of the defense psychologist portrayed McClain as going through years of psychological humiliation and putting up with victim's infidelities. In the doctor's opinion the defendant was in a "dissociated" state when she shot the victim. The State psychiatrist rejected any notion of dissociated state. The judgment was affirmed.
State v, Moore, 550 A.2d 117 (NJ 1988)
During a time period encompassing twenty-seven months, a then-35-year-old female--Marie Moore of New Jersey--held thrall over various female teenagers, an older woman (age 50), and two early male teens including one Ricky Flores, age 14. The enthrallment was couched in an elaborate illusion by Ms. Moore, by which she convinced them that she was the ex-wife of the famous composer and songwriter from New York, Billy Joel, the father of her daughter, Tammy. Once the illusion was established, Ms. Moore used the authority of "Billy Joel" to "discipline" and "punish" those around her. As her behavior raged increasingly out of control, she recruited Ricky Flores, through sexual and other favors, into the sadistic torture of her enslaved compound of adolescent girls. Although the injuries of several of the girls was taken note of by school officials, and though Marie Moore was repeatedly investigated by police and child protection agencies, insufficient evidence could be developed to arrest her. Matters began to come to a head when in the autumn of 1982, Theresa Feury, one of the victims involved, was actually killed, albeit possibly accidently [sic], by Ricky Flores, following extreme conditions of bondage, physical cruelty, and deprivation of basic physical needs. The body was hidden in Marie Moore's apartment and was not discovered until a year later by police. Moore was tried on first degree murder and was sentenced to death by the jury; Flores, a juvenile, exempt from the death penalty, plea bargained. Moore appealed to the New Jersey Supreme Court, based on errors in the trial judge's various charges to the jury. Three highly-credentialed expert witnesses for the defense stated that Marie Moore suffered from multiple personality. The trial judge should therefore have instructed the jury to address the issue of her possible diminished capacity to conform to the ordinary standards of social behavior and the law, if the testimony of the defense experts had been believed by the jury, and to consider alternative levels of conviction, such as manslaughter. Secondly, since Moore did not commit the homicide by her own hand, the death penalty should not apply. The Supreme Court agreed with both arguments. Conviction and sentencing were both reversed and the case was remanded to the original court of jurisdiction.
State v. Moran, 584 So.2d 318 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1991)
Defendant was convicted for aggravated rape and attempted kidnapping and appealed. He accosted victim in a park, forcibly raped her in his car and beat her. He threw her onto the street when she struggled with him. The victim remembers getting up and thinking she had to get to a doctor. She did not remember anything until she awoke in the hospital eleven days later. A psychiatrist found she was suffering from "psychogenic amnesia with regression." She was not able to make a statement to the police concerning the attack until 16 days after the occurrence, and the court found this to be admissible due to her regressed state. The judgments were affirmed but the case was remanded to the trial court to determine if a new trial was denied or not prior to sentencing.
State v. Perkins, 811 P.2d 1142 (1991)
Defendant appealed conviction of first degree murder, aggravated robbery and rape. He pled insanity, telling a police officer that he had split personality, one being Dennis (doing good) and the other Drifter (doing bad). One doctor who testified said that Perkins was schizophrenic, rather than having multiple personalities. Judgment affirmed.
State v. Rodrigues, 679 P.2d 615 (Haw. 1984)[See Rodrigues v. Hawaii)
The State appealed from a judgment of acquittal granted by the trial judge on pre-trial motion to determine the sanity of the defendant. For over two years after the defendant was arrested, he was treated by several doctors, both prosecution and defense. Most of the doctors believed this to be a case of "multiple personality syndrome" and in August 1982 the judge granted an acquittal. The State appealed because it felt there was sufficient evidence to present the sanity issue to a jury. This Court vacated and remanded on those grounds. It also stated that a "defense of multiple personality syndrome (MPS) does not per se require a finding of acquittal."
State v. Sanchez, 659 P.2d 1289 (Ariz. App. 1982)
Defendant appealed conviction of child molestation and sexual conduct with a minor under 15. He pled insanity based on his expert witness, who testified that Sanchez suffered from a dissociative disorder "psychogenic fugue." The Court psychologist disagreed in her testimony. Judgment affirmed.
State v. Shank, 367 S.E.2d 639 (N.C. 1988)
Defendant appealed conviction of first-degree murder. Shank had many arguments with his estranged wife about custody of their children. In the last argument, Mrs. Shank said that "no matter what he did, she would make sure that he would never get to see the children again." The defendant did not remember anything from then until he was arrested. Two psychiatrists for the defense and one for the prosecution believed the defendant to be suffering from "psychogenic amnesia," and believed the trauma he went through severe enough to prevent him from understanding what he was doing. The trial court did not allow this testimony and the appeal court believes this was error and required a new trial.
State v. Shickles, 760 P.2d 291 (Utah 1988)
Defendant appealed conviction of child kidnapping. He met and became friends with the victim's family, and one day was asked to bring the children to the babysitter. He left two of the three girls with the babysitter, and brought one with him. He took her to Denver by plane, telling her they were going shopping there. In Denver he got a motel room and showered naked with her and engaged in sexual activity three times. She was not physically harmed. The next day he went to the bus station and called the child's parents. He was arrested at the bus station. The charge was kidnapping (sexual abuse charges were omitted because of lack of jurisdiction). The defendant pled not guilty by reason of insanity. Two doctors testified that he had multiple personality disorder or dissociative disorders, but the jury found him guilty and mentally ill. At the sentencing hearing, the Court imposed a ten year to life sentence. The Appeals Court reversed and remanded.
State v. Summers, 614 P.2d 925 (Hawaii 1980)
Defendant appealed conviction of carrying firearm without permit or license. He pled insanity and a three member sanity commission unanimously found that he was now able to stand trial, but that he was substantially mentally impaired at the time of offense. He was diagnosed with schizophrenia reaction, paranoid type, and hysterical neurosis (or multiple personality disorder). A pre-trial motion for acquittal was denied, and the jury found him guilty. The appeal affirmed the decision.
State v. Swails, 66 So.2d 796 (La. 1953)
The defendant was indicted for murder and attempted murder, and he pled insanity. At the insanity hearing, two doctors examined him and testified he was presently insane. The Court had him committed to the state institution. Eight months later the hospital informed the judge that the defendant's condition had improved to the point of being able to understand the charges against him and to aid in his own defense. At the next hearing the Court again sent him back because of insanity. This appeal to the Supreme Court of Louisiana reversed and remanded the case to trial.
State v. Watkins, 340 So.2d 235 (La. 1976)
Defendant appealed conviction of aggravated rape and mandatory death sentence. A nurse was requested by Watkins from a home nursing service, and when she got to the defendant's home, she was forcibly assaulted and raped. She was then tied up and left in a wooded area near a field. The victim freed herself and later identified the defendant as her assailant. He pled not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity, saying that he could not remember anything surrounding the incident. The defense offered testimony from a doctor who said that Watkins could not distinguish right from wrong at the time of the offense, and suffered from "hysterical neurosis of the dissociated type." The prosecution produced a taped statement which damaged the amnesia theory. The Appeals Court affirmed the conviction, but remanded case to district court for resentencing.
State v. Woodard, 404 S.E.2d 6 (N.C. App. 1991)
Defendant appealed conviction of four counts of first-degree burglary, four counts of first-degree rape, and eight counts of first-degree sexual offense with a sentence of two consecutive life sentences. This case deals with a probable multiple personality, and the results of not giving the court information concerning this. The defense made a decision not to elicit testimony from the alter personality "Johnny Gustud," fearing it might appear to the jury as a "Hollywood ploy." This approach backfired when "Johnny Gustud" came out during the charge conference, and was not allowed to testify. He became disruptive and had to be removed from the court-room for the rest of the trial. The judgment was affirmed.
Thompson v. State, 542 So.2d 1286 (Ala. Cr. App. 1988)
Defendant appealed conviction of capital murder, and the sentence of death. This shocking and brutal murder of the victim who was engaged to a friend of the defendant, appeared to be the work of a madman. The burden of proof of insanity fell to the defense. The defendant's father testified that he believed his son suffered from multiple personality disorder, but there were no expert witnesses who had interviewed him to testify to that opinion. The lunacy commission found him to be sane. This court affirmed trial court's convictions.
United States ex. rel. Heirens v. Pate, 405 F.2d 449 (1968)
Petition for habeas corpus was denied, and appealed. In September 1946 the petitioner (Heirens) pleaded guilty to three charges of murder and twenty-six charges of burglary, robbery and assault and received three consecutive life sentences on the murder convictions plus other consecutive sentences for other charges. The court had previously ordered a panel of three psychiatrists to examine Heirens, and their report stated that he was sane. Since there was no evidence to doubt the petitioner's sanity, the trial court did not conduct a competency hearing. The petitioner objected to the fact that the opinion of a fourth doctor, who interviewed Heirens with sodium pentothal, was not included. That doctor advised the State Attorney that petitioner was a "schizophrenic with a dual personality," but the State chose not to include that information in the report. The Appeals Court affirmed prior proceedings.
United States ex. rel. Parson v. Anderson, 354 F. Supp. 1060 (1972)
State prisoner petitioned for habeas corpus (Sec Parson v. State). This petition dealt thoroughly with the amnesia and insanity questions. This Court's decision was basically to recommend mercy in regard to the death penalty.
United States v. Davis, 835 F.2d 274 (11th Cir. 1988)
Defendant appealed conviction of bank robbery. He pleaded not guilty by reason of insanity, and on this appeal defendant argued that court allowed and elicited improper psychiatric testimony. In the trial defendant had three prisoners from jail testify that they had seen personality changes in Davis. Defense also called an expert witness, Dr. George B. Greaves, who described multiple personalities but was unable to determine if Davis had the condition as he had not personally interviewed the defendant. Greaves also said that having multiple personality disorder did not indicate that a person is unable to know what he was doing. The government called a psychiatrist who diagnosed Davis as having an antisocial personality disorder. Judgment affirmed.
United States v. Hopkins, 169 F. Supp. 187 (D. Md. 1958)
Defendant was charged with seven counts of stealing from authorized mail receptacles, and his defense was insanity. This case went into Hopkins' past and discussed his history of mental problems and lost time, amnesia, and possible "other personality." Many doctors had different opinions of his diagnosis, but none were sufficiently convincing to show him insane. The court was convinced that he took checks from the mailboxes for personal gain, and not from insanity, despite his mental problems.
United States v. Warren, 447 F.2d 278 (1971)
The defendant appealed a conviction of unlawful interstate transportation of four valuable stolen paintings. Defendant pled temporary insanity, due to the drug prednisone he was taking at the time for asthma. The defense doctors testified that Warren must have been taking more than the prescribed dose and caused "fugues, confabulation and dissociated state." The defendant, a successful businessman, stole valuable paintings from an acquaintance and proceeded to try to sell them to an art gallery. The defense tried to show that while stealing, transporting, and attempting to sell the paintings, Warren was possibly in an irresponsible disassociated state. The Appeals Court affirmed trial court's judgment.
Wheeler v. Sullivan, 888 F.2d 1233 (8th Cir. 1989)
Ms. Wheeler had applied for social security disability benefits due to severe mental impairment, and was denied by Sullivan, Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services. She took the case to court which upheld the Secretary's decision, and Wheeler appealed. Much psychological testing was done and many diagnoses given including multiple personality, but because her impairment did not meet criteria for the Listing of Impairments for disability, she was not given benefits. However, this Court stated that the Secretary must use vocational expert testimony to meet his burden of showing Wheeler capable of doing past work--in this case housekeeping. The case was reversed and remanded for further proceedings.
no subject
Date: 2024-07-21 05:34 am (UTC)thanks for putting this all together, a few of us are really interested in criminal law but too lazy to dig through cases on our own. the way crime by multiples (or presumed multiples) is handled is fascinating.
no subject
Date: 2024-07-21 04:31 pm (UTC)